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INEQUALITY AND ITS IMPACT ON SECURITY, PUBLIC SAFETY AND MIGRATION – AN EXPLORATORY PAPER

André du Pisani+

Abstract

This exploratory paper discusses, from different theoretical perspectives, the chief contours of global inequality and reflects on its impact on security, public safety and migration. The paper departs from the assumption that global inequality, in its different forms, has important implications for global security and its provision, for public safety and for migration. While globalization in its current form did not give rise to all trans-national and trans-sovereign problems, it has accelerated and intensified them. Globalization can exacerbate fractures in state authority and capacity and gives trans-national problems such as migration, public safety and security greater reach, speed, intensity, and impact. The different impacts of inequality are considered within a conceptual framing of security, public safety and migration.

One important *caveat* is in order: this is not a policy brief, but an *analytical* paper that may, if need be, through *dialogue, inform* the development of one or more policy briefs.

'The prejudices of professors, we call theory'.

Mark Twain

Introduction

The complex landscape of global, and increasingly of inter- and intra-regional inequality, has long been the subject of analysis from different theoretical perspectives. The latter, different theories, range from social constructivism, to post-positivism (with post-colonialism thrown in for good measure), to economic liberalism, to Realist mercantilists, to Neo-Marxism. One scholar of the International Political Economy (IPE) or Global Political Economy (GPE) as it is also called, Watson 2014, identified no less than 19 different 'traditions of thought' in IPE[1]

Debates about the IPE are much more than debates about statistics. These are debates about power, policy, governance, justice, and the relationship between Politics and Economics. Debates about the relationships between 'Development' and 'Underdevelopment', and debates about what is globalization and who benefits from it? These debates navigate their way through a range of academic disciplines and ideologies – while some are much more quantitative and empirical in nature, others are more qualitative

and historical, where the analyst/scholar puts herself/himself inside the subject in an attempt to understand the moral dilemmas, ideologies, interests and values that drive a range of actors to move in certain directions. Several other analysts maintain that these positions can be combined and that a more constructive theoretical 'middle ground' can be found[2]

Theories and Debates

All these theories attempt to engage with a large number of different subjects, including trade, trade justice, inequality, production, finance, corporations, institutions, varieties of capitalism, security, and a host of other issues. This very diversity gives rise to complex debates about the *delimitation* of IPE/GPE and about the best ways of approaching the various issues. It has also been suggested to change the name of the field of study from IPE to GPE (Global Political Economy). The names cover the same topics, but I, in common with other leading analysts, prefer to call it IPE.

While it is impossible to do justice to all theories and subjects of IPE within the scope of one academic paper - that would require a separate book - it is nonetheless important to briefly introduce the major contemporary debates in IPE and the various theoretical views that drive these debates. Theories are helpful, for they assist us in organizing the field of IPE, even if they obscure parts of reality and can lead one to wrong conclusions. It is also important to point out that theories make normative commitments, for they each posit specific preferences as to how politics and economics ideally should be related and governed.

The first area of disagreement concerns different constructs of power (hard and 'soft power' a descriptive and not a normative category, nor an alternative to hard power politics) as Joseph S. Nye defines the latter in his seminal study, entitled *The Future of Power.* New York: Public Affairs, 2011) - and the relationship between politics and economics. Is politics driving economics or is it the other way around? For mercantilists, states control markets; politics is in control of economics. Liberals acknowledge the influence of politics, but they consider the market a relative autonomous sphere of society, which has a dynamic of its own. Analytically and practically, Liberals separate politics from economics. For Marxists, the trans-national class forces emerging from the global capitalist economy are the basic drivers of global inequality, injustice, the economy and of politics. This debate is important, because it shapes our understanding of who has power in the global system today and thus drives the major change in the global economy.

The second area of sharp disagreement concerns development and underdevelopment in the developing world, in the semi- periphery and in the periphery. Liberals emphasize the constructive role of different kinds of markets (such as factor, commodity and currency markets) for global economic development; mercantilists point to the leading role of strong states in the process. Marxists emphasize the core-periphery relations of dependency and exploitation that retard and even arrest autonomous development in the 'Third World' (the term used by many Marxist scholars for 'developing world'). One could argue that China, India, Brazil, and several other states, had high rates of economic growth. Collectively, these states raise new issues about the conditions that promote or impede a process of development and greater global equality.

The third area of contestation is about the nature and extent of economic globalization. Who drives the process, and who benefits from it? For liberals it is a market-driven process with great potential to bring benefits to all. While most economists, focus on how trade liberalization affects efficiency and growth. But: there is another discussion; *fair trade versus Free Trade.* The former, *fair trade*, would emerge as Stiglitz (2006: 73) points out, if all subsidies and trade restrictions were eliminated. Pointing out that the current international system 'is nowhere near such a regime'. For mercantilists, strong or hegemonic states are basically driving globalization and heavily influence who gets what from the process. Marxists see globalization as an uneven, hierarchical and skewed process where the advanced industrialized countries and the trans-national capitalist class, benefit the most[3]

While it is arguably true that a world characterized by global capital, the growing importance of financial markets and economic globalization, more generally, requires a firm foundation of rules and regulations, to work. The more important and urgent question is: who should provide such a foundation and framework? How should the politics of such a framework look like? Who should be involved in setting up and governing the framework? Should hegemonic states and their allies, as mercantilists argue, provide such a framework? But: it needs to be pointed out that *hegemonic stability theory* is not exclusively mercantilist. There is also a very clear ideological and political element: the dominant states do not merely manipulate international economic relations for their own sake; such states claim that they create an open world economy based on free trade which is to the benefit of all participating states and not only to the hegemons. This version of the theory was first advanced by Charles Kindleberger as early as 1973[4] and then further refined by Robert Gilpin in 1987[5] and informed by more recent debates[6]

At the ideological and political level, if one were to accept the precepts of hegemonic stability theory, and if it is true, then one has to expect international markets to be dependent on the existence of a liberal or more than one liberal dominant power[7]. Such an acceptance also implies the risk that global economic relations may morph into nationalistic, self-interested, protectionist competition, as did happen in the world economic crisis of the 1930s, when states pursued narrow nationalist economic policies. Some analysts argue that in the aftermath of the 2008 global fiscal crisis (Siglitz, 2015, calls it '*the crisis after the crisis*'), the global capitalist order itself is in crisis. BREXIT and the coming to power of Donald Trump in the USA in 2016 may well usher in more narrowly focused nationalist concerns with these states increasingly unwilling to meet their global responsibilities in the areas of public health, education, income distribution and inequality.

The debate about the hegemonic decline of the United States is complex. Marxist scholars such as Robert Cox[8] agree that we have witnessed a relative economic decline of the US and that this in itself presents problems for a stable international economic order. But he follows Antonio Gramsci by emphasizing the ideological dimensions of hegemony. Ultimately, according to Cox, hegemony is based on a shared set of values and understandings derived '*from the ways of doing and thinking of the dominant social strata of the dominant state'* (Cox 1996: 517).

Other scholars argue that the current crisis in the world economy is not conducive to a stable liberal hegemonic order; that is the basis for US weakness[9] Whatever one's personal view on this important matter, it is clear that the liberal claim that an unregulated market and free trade will lead to the best

results for *all* states, is clearly false, for asymmetries in liberalization can and do benefit some countries and regions at the expense of others. It is equally false to posit that all forms of integration in the world economy must lead to underdevelopment, as some dependency theorists tend to argue. There are simply too many exceptions to assert such a claim, for example in cases of relatively equitable regional integration. It is also a false claim, as the liberal theorists assert, that the role of the state in the economy should inevitably be a minimal one, for in many of the 'success stories', the state played a pivotal role – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan – to mention but a few.

From the above framing of the subject, it is clear that any discussion of inequality, public safety, security, and migration, unavoidably has to touch upon contrasting theoretical approaches and views of the nature of the international system and of globalization in its different dimensions.

Inequality

The world's people are sharply divided into rich or relatively wealthy and poor and the two sides of the divide are deeply imbalanced. The rich few own most of the world's wealth, while the majority of people share the remainder. Most of the world's rich are concentrated in specific regions – North America, Western Europe and in some South East Asian countries. Statistics show that roughly 10 percent of the world's people own 85 percent of the world's wealth. The top 1 percent of people own about 40%. The top 62 billionaires of the world own nearly 50% of the world's wealth. While 50% of the world's people, own about 1% of the world's wealth; if one were to use The World Bank's definition of *extreme poverty* as having less than $1.25 a day to live on, then roughly 1.3 billion people – one-fifth of the world's population are living in extreme poverty. The *2016 OXFAM Multi-dimensional Poverty Index, talks of 'An Economy of the 1%'.* The Index shows that the wealth of the poorest half of the world's population has fallen by a trillion dollars since 2014.

The distribution of wealth is manifestly uneven, also within countries and regions. The measurement of inequality as the Indian development economist, Amartya Sen pointed out is a complex matter. If development is understood as an amalgam of capacity, agency, well-being or freedoms, as Sen argues, then there is need for a multi-level index of poverty and of inequality[10] The most commonly used index of poverty is the head-count measure *H*, which identifies poverty with the proportion of people who have income levels below a chosen 'poverty line'. Sen comments succinctly: "*However, aside from the arbitrariness involved in identifying an appropriate 'poverty line' income, the head-count indicator pays no attention to the extent of the shortfall below the poverty line that people have. Nor does it take any interest in the distribution of the aggregate shortfall among those who are poor"* (Sen, 2017: 370).

This has led to the developing of *distribution-sensitive* measures of poverty. The literature on poverty measurement has tended to proceed by taking note of the income shortfalls of the different persons, giving greater weights to shortfall as lower and lower income levels are being considered. Using an ordinal approach to income measurement, and calculating the average extent of the income shortfall of the poor, *I*, and the Gini coefficient *G of the income distribution among the poor*, along with the head-count measure *H* – with axioms of some plausibility, the poverty measure *P* turns out to be given by:

P = H [I + (1 – 1) G].

There has been an extensive body of literature on *distribution-sensitive* poverty measures with axiomatic variations. This literature is characterized by deep disagreements on valuation methods. The same comment holds for debates about *aggregate real income*, and also on mobility. While these methodological questions lie beyond the scope of this cursory paper, it is true to say that the rapidly expanding literature on *multi-dimensional poverty indexes and evaluation*, has been making a valuable contribution in linking *welfare theory* to *empirical infromation*[11] In understanding inequality and poverty, there is a strong case for looking at real *deprivation.*

Arguably, the three most useful *Multi-dimensional Poverty and Human Development Indexes* are the *Human Development Reports* complied and published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the *OXFAM Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index,* and *The Africa Prosperity Report*, produced by the Legatum Institute. The latest versions of all three are for 2016.

The UNDP *2016 Human Development Report* (HDR)[12], released on 21 March 2017, comprises of a composite of five (5) indices each year: *the Human Development Index (HDI), the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), the Gender Development Index (GDI), the Gender Inequality Index (GII), and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI).* Data used in these indices and other human development indicators included in these Reports are provided by a variety of public international sources and represent the best statistics available for those indicators at the time of the preparation of the annual report.

The *OXFAM Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index[13]* covers 102 countries in total, including 75 per cent of the world's population, or 5.2 billion. Of this proportion, *30 per cent* of people *(1.6 billion) are identified as multi-dimensionally poor. A person is identified as multi-dimensionally poor (or 'MPI' poor) if they are deprived in at least one third of the dimensions. The OXFAM Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index* uses Ten Indicators to measure three 'dimensions' of poverty. These are: Health, Education, and Living Standard. For Health there are two indicators, namely: Nutrition and Child Mortality. Education has two indicators: Years of Schooling and School Attendance, while Living Standard has six (6) indicators, namely: Cooking Fuel, Sanitation, Water, Electricity, Floor and Assets.

Both of these Indexes have their problems. The UNDP Human Development Reports have to rely on countries with the available HDI values. The OXFAM Index tends to ignore gender and unemployment as variables, but it does dig *below national level* (where possible), giving separate results for sub-national regions. The Oxfam Index uses $1.90/day as its poverty line.

Since the 2016 MPI focuses on Africa, and for purposes of this presentation, I wish to highlight the following key findings in relation to Africa:

- Almost one third of MPI poor people live in Sub-Saharan Africa (32. %); 53% in South Asia, and 9% in East Asia.
- As with income poverty, three quarters of MPI poor people live in Middle Income Countries.
- In the 46 African countries analysed, 544 million people (54% of total population) endure multi-dimensional poverty, compared to 388 million poor people according to the $1.90/day measures.

- The differences between the proportion of $ 1.90 and MPI poor people are greatest in East and West Africa. Measured against the $1.90/day poverty line, 48% in West Africa and 33% in East Africa are poor, whereas by the MPI, 70% of people in East Africa are MPI poor and 59% in West Africa. The MPI thus shows hidden aspects of poverty that may be overlooked if we consider only its income dimensions.

- Among 35 African countries were changes to poverty over time were considered, 30 of them have reduced poverty significantly. Rwanda did the best of all these countries, but every MPI indicator was meaningfully reduced in Burkina Faso, Comoros, Gabon and Mozambique as well.

- Disaggregated MPI results are available for 475 sub-national regions in 41 African countries. The poorest region continues to be Salamat in Chad, followed by Est in Burkina Faso and Hadjer Iamis in Chad. The region with the highest percentage of MPI poor people is Warap, in South Sudan, where 99% of its inhabitants are considered multi-dimensionally poor. The least-poor sub-national regions include Grand Casablanca in Morocco and New Valley in Egypt, with less than 1% of the population living in multi-dimensional poverty.

- The Sahel and Savanna Belt in Sudan contain most of the world's poorest sub-regions, pointing to the interface between poverty and precarious environmental conditions.

- Poverty looks very different in different parts of the continent. While in East Africa deprivations relating to living standards contribute most to poverty, in West Africa child mortality and education are the biggest challenges. In Southern Africa unemployment, electricity, nutrition, sanitation, and child mortality are high.

- Overall, the deprivations affecting the highest share of MPI poor people in Africa are cooking fuel, electricity and sanitation.

- The number of poor people went down in only 12 African countries. In 18 countries, although the incidence of MPI fell, *population growth led to an overall rise in the number of poor people[14]*

From the above brief and incomplete summary of the *2016 OXFAM MPI Index* it is clear that drilling down below national level statistics (of which MPI is one illustration) has significant critical implications for development policy, even if the Index is problematic in other respects.

The Africa Prosperity Report 2016 of the *Legatum Institute* has been produced over the past few years. The latest iteration of the Report, shows that "*decades of economic growth across the continent has failed to deliver greater levels of prosperity for many African countries*"[15]

The *Africa Prosperity Report* 2016, assesses a country's level of wealth (GDP per capita) against its overall ranking in the Legatum Institute's annual *Prosperity Index*, which uses eight *economic and social factors, including: Entrepreneurship & Opportunity; Governance; Education; Health; Safety and Security; Personal Freedom, and Social Capital.*

Some of the key findings for 2016 were that Rwanda has the biggest 'Prosperity Surplus' in Africa (even though its GDP per capita is $ 1661), it came top of the rankings due to the significant reforms that country has made recently to strengthen the rule of law and reduce corruption. Senegal and Burkina Faso, too, according to the Index, showed 'large surpluses' based on their 'over-achievement' in personal freedom and Governance. The Central African Republic (CAR) has the biggest 'Prosperity Deficit' in Africa – with a

GDP of $594. In 2016, Angola was significantly 'under-achieving', notwithstanding its high GDP per capita of $6949. That country's high unemployment rate and mixed civil liberties record dragged it down.

Measured against the *Legatum Prosperity Index* the **Africa Rankings for 2016,** included amongst the top ten (10): South Africa, Botswana, Morocco, Namibia, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal, Rwanda, Ghana and Burkina Faso (in that order). The bottom ten (10) countries were: Zimbabwe, Togo, Guinea, Liberia, Angola, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) [16].

Like all other prosperity and poverty indexes, the *Legatum Prosperity Index*, has its own biases, peculiarities and shortcomings. According to this 2016 Index, Sub-Saharan Africa lagged behind Asia in terms of prosperity and roughly delivered the same prosperity with its growth as Latin America and the Caribbean. When considered on their income level (as per World Bank definition) and 'prosperity delivery', Africa clusters around 'one of four groups', namely: "low-income over-delivery (Group 1: best, middle-income over-delivery (Group 2: good), low-income under-delivery group (Group 3: poor), and middle-income under-delivery (Group 4: worst)" (Legatum Institute, *The 2016 Africa Prosperity Report*, p. 15, Table 3).

Inequality and its impact on Security, Public Safety and Migration

Scholarship dealing with inequality and its relationships to security, public safety and migration is extensive and multi-disciplinary. Broadly, the ideas tend to group around 'systemic' and 'structural' explanations and those scholars who emphasize 'unit' explanations such as collectives – states, ethnic groups and governance. The most useful studies, such as the book by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, published in 1998[17], advances a multi-level *sector* delineated understanding of the construct of 'security', as comprising of a 'military sector', 'the environmental sector', 'the economic sector', 'the societal sector' and 'the political sector'. Writing from a *critical security studies perspective*, this important book emphasizes the *linkages* across the different security-related sectors – thus stressing 'cross-sector security connections' and the need to be sensitive to '*the level-of-analysis problem'* when analyzing security in its different referents and domains. This, broadly, is the approach that this paper will employ.

Societal Security

In respect of *societal security*, it is important to bear in mind, that while *national security* has been the established key concept for the entire area of security affairs, there has been little reflection on the *nation* as a security unit. The focus has been on the political, institutional unit-the state- and accordingly on the political and military sectors. *Societal security* is closely related to, but nonetheless distinct from, political security, which is about the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies and politics that bestow governments and states their legitimacy.

The organizing concept in the *societal sector* is identity. The definition is not in terms of nations. *Societal security* is about meaningful and relatively large self-sustaining identity groups, what these are empirically varies in both time and place. It is important to point out that *societal security* is not the same as *social security. Social security is about individuals and is largely economic. Societal security is about collectives*

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and their identity. Clearly, empirical links will often exist when the social conditions for individual life influence processes of collective identification, as Waever et.al. (1993) pointed out.

There is another problem with *societal* and that is that the related term *society* is often used to designate the wider, *state population*, which may refer to a group that does not always carry an identity. The concept *nation* carries the same ambiguity, since actual nations operate differently and are in many cases 'imagined communities' to invoke Benedict Andersen: Some self-define their 'nation' in terms of the people living in and loyal to the same state; others define theirs as an ethnic, organic community of language, history, blood, and culture. In the case of the former, emotional attachment is to something non-organic and more political, whereas in other case – and sometimes among competing groups in the same case – the ethnic community of the 'real people' is contrasted with the more amorphous groups of all those who happen to share the territory.

The above observations lead to the inevitable conclusion that 'public safety' and 'security' has to be problematized within an actual societal context. Moreover, the *societal security agenda* has been set by different actors, at different times and regions. Some of the most common issues that have been viewed as threat to *societal security*, following Waever, et.al. (1998) include, but are not limited to:

1. *"Migration* – X people are being overrun or diluted by cultural, linguistic, political, and religious influences of Y people; the X community will not be what it used to be, because of the demographic change in the population; consequently, the perception takes root that X identity is being changed by a shift in the population (e.g. Chinese migration into Tibet, Russian migration into Estonia, African migration into Southern and Western (Northern) Europe, African migration into the USA)".
2. *"Horizontal competition* – while it is still X people living there, they will change their ways because of the overriding cultural and linguistic influence from a neighboring culture Y (e.g. Quebecois fears of Anglophone Canada and, more generally, Canadian fears of Americanization, Basque fears of Spain)".
3. *"Vertical competition* – people will stop seeing themselves as X, because there is either an integrating project (e.g. the European Union) or a secessionist – "regionalist" project (e.g. Quebec, Catalonia, Kurdistan) that pulls them toward either wider or narrower identities" (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998:121).
4. Some analysts would point to depopulation, whether by plague, war, famine, natural disaster, or politics of ethnic cleansing and extermination as a forth issue.

The focus now turns more specifically towards *Public Safety* and then to *Migration,* while returning to the wider debate on *Inequality*, before reaching a few conclusions that may have policy and political implications.

Public Safety

Following the logic relevant to *societal security*, with its key referent objects fairly large collective identities such as those associated with communities and ethnic and linguistic groups - that can function relatively independent from the state or the nation – it is extremely difficult to establish 'hard' boundaries

that differentiate existential from lesser threats. Thus, whether migrants or rival identities are 'securitized'[18] depend upon whether the holders of the collective identity take a relatively close-minded or a relatively open-minded view of how their identity is constituted and maintained. Understood as such, 'public safety' forms a residual category of 'societal security' of which the size and scale variables can differ markedly.

It is noteworthy that many security analysts do not specifically include 'public safety' and its relationship to other dimensions and/or 'sectors' of security in their work. Yet, we know from empirical examples in many different contexts, that public safety is often compromised in the context of transitions to democracy, and where social cohesion is low at the national and or regional level. The associated debate on 'security sector reform' that in some cases, formed part of a wider donor agenda, tended to neglect public safety aspects of security in favor of a focus on national defence forces, often even excluding the police and the wider criminal justice system from being considered[19]

Case studies from a number of countries that attempted to make complex transitions from war to peace, such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe within the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have pointed to the importance of national security and the role of the police and criminal justice system more generally, to deal with crime and the consequences of incomplete processes of Demobilization, Demilitarization, and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and rival armies – all matters of great concern to *societal security* and to *public safety.*

It is noteworthy that the SADC, especially in the *Revised Edition of the Harmonized Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation,* popularly known as SIPOII, of August 2010, provides for '*The Public Security Sector'* and somewhat problematically, for *'The Police Sector'*(in addition to the 'Political Sector', the 'Defence Sector' and the 'State Security Sector')*.

In the Revised (Harmonized) SIPO, '*The Public Security Sector*' covers a wide terrain of issues such as 'services in law enforcement, *public safety*, corrections/prisons, immigration, parks and wildlife, customs and refugees'[20] In the SADC framework, the *public security sector* as a distinct cross-border dimension to it in terms of cross-border operations and the implementation of SADC protocols on the combating of illicit drug trafficking, and on firearms, ammunition and other related materials. SADC recognizes that the *public security sector* continues to face various challenges. These range from: transnational crime, cybercrime, terrorism, drug dealing and trafficking, violent crime, control and regulation of private security companies, the proliferation of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons, HIV/AIDS, illegal migration, money laundering and cash in transit heists, overcrowding in correctional facilities, poaching , maritime piracy, poaching to smuggling of goods[21]

In the revised (harmonized) SIPO of August 2010, SADC provides for '*The Police Sector*'. The new sector was incorporated, following the SADC Summit decision held in Maseru, Lesotho in 2006, to create the *Police Chiefs Sub-committee* as a SADC Institution under the *Inter State, Defence and Security Committee* of the SADC Organ. The rationale for creating this Sector was that it would complement and recognize *"policing as a unique service within the framework of regional peace and security"*. The overriding objective was "*to strengthen policing institutions with the view of carving a crime free zone, where citizens

can pursue their endeavours unperturbed by criminal elements[22]" In terms of substantive matters, there is extensive overlap between the Police and the Public Security sectors, leading some analysts to question the rationale and need for both sectors in the Revised (harmonized) SIPO[23].

From the above brief overview of *public safety* it is clear that it is a complex and diverse terrain of *societal security* that takes on different dimensions in different parts of the world, shaped by history, the political-economy and by policy and institutional arrangements. In the case of the Ohio State Government in the USA, for example the Department of Public Safety deals with driver safety and training, vehicle accidents, natural disasters, family disaster preparedness, human trafficking and law enforcement, for example in terms of traffic crash procedures.

The focus of the paper now turns to migration as a key aspect of *societal security.*

Migration

As alluded to earlier in this paper, *migration* is one of the most common issues that have been viewed as threats to *societal security.* Although analytically distinct, the four types of threat to societal security can at times be *combined;* namely: migration, horizontal competition, vertical competition, and depopulation as a result of famine, war, natural catastrophe and genocide or extermination. Often migration can cultivate 'enemy images' that are being politicized and, in the context of terrorism 'securitized', notably by populist politicians but also by democratic governments.

While migration is as old as human history itself, in practice, the sources for it range from intentional, to economic and political at one end of a spectrum, to structural at the other. Migrants may make individual decisions to move from reasons varying from economic opportunity, to environmental drivers, to political and religious freedom. But they may also move as part of a wider political project to homogenize the population of the state, as in the Sinification of Tibet and the 'Russification' of Central Asia and the Baltic states. Horizontal competition may simply reflect the unintended effects of interplay between larger and small cultures. But, it can also become intentional, as in the 'remaking' of former occupied enemies, for example as in the cases of the Americanization of Germany and Japan after the Second World War and in the cultural aspects of contemporary trade policy. Vertical competition is more likely to be found at the intentional end of the spectrum.

There are also other more sociological dimensions of integration projects that seek to shape a common culture in terms of the state attempting to control some or all of the machineries of cultural reproduction such as churches, schools, and language rights. Comparative experience shows that society can broadly react to the perceived or real threat of migration to societal security in two ways: through activities carried out by the community itself or by elevating the issue to the policy and political agenda. What then often happens is that at the state level, the perceived or real threat of immigration, can be addressed through tough and at times undemocratic legislation, and border controls. State-directed responses are common, which makes the societal sector difficult to analyze because it tends to blend with the political sector.

The choice of whether to see societal security as a task for society itself, as a task of the state, or as an argument for achieving statehood can have a significant impact on the regional dynamics of migration.

Whatever policy choice is ultimately made has an important bearing on the relationship between the societal and the political sector, as well as on the prospects of immigrants to be meaningfully integrated into their new society.

Most societal security issues are ultimately about identity, and in some cases, the medium in which they play out is often also identity (horizontal and vertical competition), whereas in others it is not (migration, infrastructure of reproduction). One example of this dynamic is the United States of America (USA).

In a historically nuanced discussion of migration in relation to the United States of America (US), Joseph S. Nye near-prophetically warned: "*A more serious concern would be if the United States turned inward and seriously curtailed immigration. [Adding, that] …"Fears over the effect of immigration on national values and on a coherent sense of American identity have existed since the early years of the nation"*[24]

Despite being a nation of immigrants, various polls show that a plurality or majority of Americans wants fewer immigrants coming into the country. The post 2008 economic recession in that country seemingly exacerbated such views, while some demographers have portrayed a country in 2050 in which non-Hispanic whites will be only a slim majority. It is projected that Hispanics will be around 25 percent; blacks 14 percent, and Asians, 8 percent[25]

Especially, since 2015 that saw migration from the Near East, North- and West Africa mostly into different regions of Europe reaching its apogee, a new debate started on what one insightful publication calls "*the causes of flight".* This is an ongoing debate that is as much about Europe and European policy, as it is about fragility in parts of Africa and profoundly about the International Political Economy (IPE) and its deep inequalities.

Current debates on migration emphasize significantly more than the narrow *political* dimensions of the phenomenon, by emphasizing the complex and dynamic relations between, mostly, European policy and migration or flight. According to such approaches, such recognition, constitutes "*the fundamental precondition of measures that would really be able to help prevent the destruction of people's bases of existence*"[26]

These important new debates emphasize that (in this case) European governments, tend to consolidate their development policy engagement in certain destination regions, where they break-up smuggler networks or cooperate on border management in terms of their national security policies. The key problem with this approach, it is argued, is that it does not focus on the underlying causes of flight in the countries of origin, but rather at reducing the flight of migrants into Europe. What is called for is in addition to a sober analysis of the 'reasons for flight', is also a *critical analysis of the diverse impacts on specific regions of European policy in domains such as energy and climate change, foreign and security policy, arms exports to regions in crisis, tax policy, human rights violations and displacements of workers employed by European companies, agricultural and fishing policies and EU trade policy.*

The debate has indeed shifted to ask why migrants leave their countries in the first place. The answer to this key question varies considerably and goes beyond the rather narrow concept of the *political refugee.* For a significant number of migrants and refugees, their decision to leave their own countries, is related

to a necessary adaptation "*to deteriorating living conditions and has deep-lying political, environmental and economic causes"* (Bransdorf, 2017: 1, accessed at: http://www.fes.de/de/en/iez/globale-politik-und-entwicklung/artikel-in-globale-politik-und , accessed on 19 July 2017.

Many factors are making life in different parts of the world increasingly difficult: conflicts and wars, natural catastrophes, such as floods and droughts, political discrimination and persecution, poverty, inequality and the absence of hope and employment prospects, especially for youth.

The diversity of perspectives and issued touched upon above, suggest the need for a comprehensive *African-European Policy Dialogue* that should include the political, social and economic impacts of European policies in Africa and beyond. The need for such a dialogue is seemingly overdue and should be *research-based.*

The other dimensions that are increasingly being linked to migration into Europe are: moves within the European Union (EU) towards a more coordinated common defence and, especially counter-terrorism policy, and the growing importance of immigration in the election campaigns and the politics of different European countries, among them: France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Italy, most recently.

The former, moves within the EU towards a more integrated defence policy, while understandable within the current configuration of world politics, notably the need for the EU member states to share more of the defence burden and to coordinate twenty-eight [soon twenty-seven] individual and weakly coordinated defence policies, amidst growing transatlantic uncertainty, and the spectre of new Russian assertiveness, may over the longer-haul have risks for African-European relations, particularly in the context of ongoing and accelerated migration into Europe and the politicization of counter-terrorism policies.

The second dimension – the growing salience of immigration in the politics of the EU – is of more immediate concern and potentially much more difficult to resolve; for "*what is morally right, however, is not always economically rational or politically feasible"*[27] The political left in the EU, one writer argues, [that], "*Given the human catastrophe unfolding before our eyes on the Mediterranean, we have a moral imperative to pursue managing migration to Europe more humanely".* (In 2016 more than 5,000 people drowned in the Mediterranean in an attempt to reach Europe, according to the International Organisation on Migration (IOM)). The same writer also argues that the positive economic impact migration can have on the migrants themselves, the countries they come from and the communities that receive them ought to be recognized, even if the benefits tend to be long-term and diffuse.

Resentment around migration from those living in the host countries often arises not from a deep opposition to the principle of migration, but it is often the result of the disproportionate impact of migration on *particular communities – societal security concerns, as mentioned earlier in this paper.* So rather than attempting to close borders, there seems to be a need for more equitable burden sharing among EU-member states and a sharper focus on the considerable human, economic and social benefits that can arise from migration. Such an approach leaves no room for the construct of '*fortress Europe'.*

Migration, nonetheless, is a complex policy matter. According to available statistics, in 2015, the IOM counted 1,046,599 arrivals to Europe: 34,887 by land and 1,011,712 by sea. In 2016, after a non-legally binding agreement between Turkey and the EU, arrivals decreased to 387,739. There is indeed need for an integrated *socially and economically-driven policy on migration that articulates with among other policy framings with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015.* Other policy consideration should range from access to law for migrants that need protection of their human rights and freedoms, the idea of granting *humanitarian visas* may be considered in certain cases, access to skills training by certain categories of migrants, the rights of women migrants should be a particular focus, such as in the case of Germany that ratified and recognizes the provisions of the International Labor Organizations (ILO's) *Domestic Workers Convention*, and ensuring that women migrants have access to all the required legal documents.

The paper now brings global, regional and national inequalities into sharp relief.

Inequalities

Critical theorists, such as Collier (2007) emphasize the importance of *economic forces* as drivers of insecurity, weak public safety and migration. Paul Collier (2007) for example, argues that ethnic tensions and long-standing (even ancient) political feuds are not starting conflicts in different regions of the world- economic forces such as entrenched poverty and trade in natural resources are the real drivers[28]

Every country has a relatively distinct political economy that impacts the extent and effects of inequalities. The marked differences in the extent and nature of inequality within and across countries demonstrate that inequality is not just the result of economic factors; it is shaped by politics and policies[27]. From an economic point of view it is difficult to determine when inequalities 'turn harmful' as that precise point may differ from country to country, [however] "*once inequality becomes extreme, harmful social, economic, and political effects become evident. Extreme inequalities tend to hamper economic growth and undermine both political equality and stability. And because inequalities have cumulative economic, social, and political effects, each of these contributing factors requires separate and concerted attention"[29]*

As noted, extreme inequalities weaken not only economic security and growth, but also social and political stability. But, as Stiglitz[30] (2015:288-289) argues, "T*here is no simple causal relation between economic inequality and social stability, as measured by crime or civil disobedience. Neither form of violence correlates with Gini indices or Palma ratios (the top 10 percent of the population's share of gross national income [GNI] divided by the poorest 40 percent of the population's share of GNI). There are, however, substantial links between violence and "horizontal inequalities" that combine economic stratification with race, ethnicity, religion, or region. When the poor are from one race, ethnicity, religion, or region, and the rich are from another, a lethal, destabilizing dynamic often emerges".*

The primacy of 'horizontal inequalities' as a source for feeding insecurity and conflict, has been extensively surveyed in a 2008 study that surveyed 53 developing countries. This study highlighted the effects of assets inequality among ethnic groups, and found that if such inequalities were to deepen, then the propensity for conflict and the erosion of public safety would increase meaningfully in a statistical sense[31]

Another study using similar methods to the 2008 study found *regional disparities in wealth* to be positively correlated with a high risk of conflict onset in sub-Saharan Africa[32] This comparative study emphasized the importance of *regime type, governance, and political leadership* in escalating and/ or de-escalating the propensity towards societal conflict. Regional disparities do matter, but the ways in which these are being responded to at the political, governance and leadership levels, count for a great deal.

Other scholars have used a different methodology – rather than surveys to measure inequalities – and they, too, argued that where *geographical disparities in income are linked to ethnic differentiation and access to power,* such large horizontal inequalities are bound to be a source of insecurity and social conflict[33]

In Conclusion

The multidimensional nature and complexity of inequality (in its different forms and dimensions), of security, public safety, and migration, suggests the need for collaborative, integrated, rights-based and socially embedded, policy responses. While these lie beyond the scope of this analytical paper, most analysts would agree that a *spectrum* of conceivable policy responses to address these issues, should range from strengthening the rule of law, diversifying the economy, harmonizing and improving the fairness of regulatory frameworks, improving governance, strengthening civil liberties and free choice, working towards ecological sustainability, and maintaining basic security across its key sectors as outlined in this paper. Other possible policy interventions should include: improving basic food and shelter provision, improve public health, delivering more meaningful education as a response to societal needs and the needs of the local economy, implementing development policies built on economic and social inclusion and shared growth, curb state-centered violence, improve sanitation, improve telecommunications infrastructure, and increase public spending on Research and Development (R&D) [34] In all of these, the key role of the state should be acknowledged.

In relation to *migration* and some aspects of *public safety* it may be most useful to critically assess the impact of EU policies in different sub-regions and countries of the world, so as to develop *collaborative* policy and political approaches and policies to these issues. State building, too, should become a priority.

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+ André du Pisani is Professor Emeritus at The University of Namibia (UNAM). He has published widely on regional integration and security, Namibian politics, and was a member of the global reflection group that produced the Report: *Providing Security in Times of Uncertainty Opting for a Mosaic Security System – Report of the Global Reflection Group-Monopoly on the Use of Force 2.07.* Over the past decade, André developed policy for the Namibian security system and is a member of the International Advisory Board of the journal: *Strategic Review for Southern Africa.* He is also a member of the Editorial Board of the *Journal of Namibian Studies.*